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Abstract
We propose Deep Distribution Transfer (DDT), a new transfer learning approach
to address the problem of zero and few-shot transfer in the context of facial forgery
detection. We examine how well a model (pre-)trained with one forgery creation
method generalizes towards a previously unseen manipulation technique or different
dataset. To facilitate this transfer, we introduce a new mixture model-based loss
formulation that learns a multi-modal distribution, with modes corresponding to
class categories of the underlying data of the source forgery method. Our core
idea is to first pre-train an encoder neural network, which maps each mode of this
distribution to the respective class labels, i.e., real or fake images in the source
domain by minimizing wasserstein distance between them. In order to transfer
this model to a new domain, we associate a few target samples with one of the
previously trained modes. In addition, we propose a spatial mixup augmentation
strategy that further helps generalization across domains. We find this learning
strategy to be surprisingly effective at domain transfer compared to a traditional
classification or even state-of-the-art domain adaptation/few-shot learning methods.
For instance, compared to the best baseline, our method improves the classification
accuracy by 4.88% for zero-shot and by 8.38% for the few-shot case transferred
from the FaceForensics++ to Dessa dataset.
1 Introduction
The rapid progress of image and video generation techniques has sparked a heated discussion
regarding the authenticity and handling of visual content, for instance, on social media or online video
platforms. In particular, so-called DeepFakes videos have become a central topic, as they have shown
the potential to create manipulated fake videos of human faces convincingly. These methods include
face-swapping techniques that artificially insert a specific person into a given target video [9; 34; 36],
as well as facial reenactment methods where the goal is to modify the expression of a face such that
the person appears to be saying something different [46; 22; 47]. As a result, these methods could be
misused, for instance, the speech of a politician or news commentator could be deliberately altered to
communicate malicious propaganda backed with forged visual content to create a compelling forgery.
This increasing availability of manipulation methods calls for the need to reliably detect such forgeries
in an automated fashion. In particular, learning-based techniques have shown promising results on
both images and videos proposed [40; 33; 28; 53; 55; 1; 3]. While training supervised classifiers with
one particular manipulation technique performs quite well on the same method, the main challenge
lies in keeping the underlying training up to date with respect to the most recent forgery approaches.
For instance, the popular FaceForensics [40] effort first provided a dataset of Face2Face [46] videos;
a year later, Face Swap [25] and DeepFakes [9] were added, and finally they authors released videos
that were edited using NeuralTextures [47]. Unfortunately, providing constant updates for this
supervised training is highly impractical since new manipulation techniques could appear from one
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day to another without any prior information. This motivates us to re-think facial forgery detection
from a zero and few-shot learning perspective. Here, our aim is to generalize features between each
method and reliably detect manipulations, despite having seen no or only very few training samples
of a particular forgery technique.
Domain adaptation methods [48; 44; 32; 52] have the potential to be applicable in this scenario.
For instance, they aim to align classes from source and target domain irrespective of their original
domain by learning a common subspace. Other few-shot learning methods [45; 43; 49; 13; 27]
successively train a model on a large variety of classes with very few samples per class across
different episodes, ultimately learning how to generalize for unseen classes. Both of these directions
have been well-studied on the standard benchmarks with a larger number of classes and where samples
from different classes are structurally very different from each other; e.g., Omniglot [26], CUB [50],
miniImageNet [49], Office-31 [41], VisDA [35] etc.. However, we found that traditional domain
adaption methods struggle in our forgery detection scenario, which maps to a binary classification
problem with a high visual similarity between each class.
To address these challenges, we introduce Deep Distribution Transfer (DDT), a novel transfer learning
method tailored for forgery detection that encompasses both zero and few-shot learning to construct
a domain-agnostic embedding space. Specifically, we propose a new mixture model-based loss
formulation that learns a multi-modal distribution, with modes corresponding to classes from the
source domain. First, we pre-train an encoder network, such that the latent codes of each mode of the
learned distribution are mapped to the respective class labels (Real and Fake) for the source dataset.
To transfer this model to a new domain, we associate each sample from the target domain with one
of the previously trained modes. Classification is then performed by assigning the class label of the
closest mode.
To summarize, the key contributions in this paper are:
• We propose DDT, a novel zero and few-shot transfer learning method for facial forgery
detection method that explicitly models the underlying data with a multimodal distribution.
• We introduce a spatial mixup augmentation strategy that improves the model’s generalization
capability in unseen scenarios (w.r.t. manipulation methods and datasets).
• We provide an extensive analysis of transfer among different facial forgery methods within
and across different datasets, showing that our approach outperforms state-of-the art on the
Dessa dataset by 4.88% in the zero-shot case and by 8.38% for the few shot case.
2 Related Work
Facial Manipulation Methods: Facial video manipulation methods have a long history in computer
graphics, coupled with the 3D reconstruction of the underlying 3D face geometry [5; 15; 46]. Recently,
we have also seen GAN-based synthesis methods generate high-quality facial imagery at remarkable
detail [21; 20; 19; 7; 42; 51; 51]; however, they struggle with temporal coherency. Hybrid methods,
such as Deep Video Portraits [22] or Deferred Neural Rendering [47], combine the advantages of both
directions by using rendered facial reconstructions as conditioning for generative neural networks,
hence providing stable anchors for the temporal domain and enabling high-quality, photo-realistic
video editing. From an application standpoint, we can categorize these techniques into (a) facial
re-enactment, which changes the expressions of the person while keeping the same identity, and (b)
identity swapping, which replaces the facial region with another person’s face.
Facial Manipulation Detection: Traditional facial manipulation leverages handcrafted features such
as gradients or compression patterns, in order to find inconsistencies within an image [2; 12; 30].
While such self-consistency can produce good results, these methods are less accurate than more
recent learning-based techniques based on convolutional neural networks [53]. Hybrid methods
can leverage both traditional and learned features in a two-stream fashion [55], or focus on face-
specific expressions and motion to identify an individual person [40; 3]. These detection methods are,
however, supervised in nature, and struggle to generalize between domains and datasets.
Zero and Few-Shot Learning: Zero and few-shot learning methods [6; 13; 49; 43; 45; 14; 39; 37;
38; 27; 23; 29] have the potential to facilitate transfer across manipulation techniques or datasets; for
instance, meta-learning based methods successively train a model on a large variety of tasks across
different episodes. An alternative direction is ProtoNets [43], which learns the prototype embedding
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for every class and uses the similarity between each prototype and query embedding for classification;
or Relation Nets [45] which also computes the prototype for every class while proposing a learned
similarity metric. Very recently, Cozzolino et al. [8] propose an autoencoder-based approach targeting
forensics applications, including facial manipulations, which we consider an important baseline for
our work. Their method proposes to use a pre-trained embedding on the source domain, which is then
fine-tuned on the target data. While this leads to better results than a traditional binary cross-entropy
loss, generalization nonetheless remains limited. In contrast, we learn to model each class as a
distribution, leading to significantly better generalization to new forgery methods as well as unseen
datasets.
3 Proposed Approach
The key idea of our method is to model classes as distributions, irrespective of their domain, where
data points are projected into a learned embedding space where activated components reflect each
activated class. This multi-modal distribution can then be used to efficiently facilitate zero and
few-shot learning in the respective target domain; see Fig. 1 for an overview.
Figure 1: Method overview. (a) Pre-training: θ encodes samples from the source domain into a
latent distribution q(zi|xi). c then maps class labels c to the encoded distributions of the prototype
multi-modal distribution ε. (b) Fine-tuning: the pre-trained encoder θ is used to map the few-shot
samples from the target dataset with the same prototype multi-modal distribution ε, which learns a
common subspace between samples across domains. (c) Test-time: a test sample xtest is encoded
into the latent distribution q(ztest|xtest) by using the pre-trained encoder θ. We then compute the
distance of the latent code with respect to all components of the distribution, and assign a class label
based on the component it is closest to.
3.1 Modeling of Class Distributions
We are given a large source dataset S = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 of N labeled samples and a small target
dataset T = {(xi, yi)}Mi=1 of M labeled samples such that M  N , where each xi ∈ RD is a
D-dimensional input image and yi ∈ {0, 1} is the corresponding label (0 for Real, 1 for Fake). Sc
and Tc denotes the set of data points labeled with class c in source and target dataset, respectively.
To model each class as a distribution, we learn a multi-modal Gaussian distribution ε with non-
overlapping means, which enforces that every component c acts as a unimodal distribution in its own
space. By learning a single multi-modal distribution ε with non-overlapping means, we obtain many
unimodal distributions c, each representing a particular class c, which we refer to as a prototype
multi-modal distribution. This distribution is a Gaussian mixture model consisting of several Gaussian
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distributions in the latent space, each identified by c ∈ {0, ...., C − 1}, where C is the number of
classes in our dataset. Each Gaussian c in the mixture represents a class distribution and consists of
following parameters:
• Meanmc, defining its center.
• Covariance Σc, defining its width. For brevity, we assume Σc = I .
ε =

0 = N (z;m0, I)
1 = N (z;m1, I)
...
C−1 = N (z;mC−1, I)
(1)
Naively learning the class means mc using the source training data Sc would severely overfit to
specific forgery method or dataset; i.e., it would learn a specific feature representation for this dataset
but without the capability to transfer to other manipulation methods or datasets. To this end, we
regularize the model to ensure that the class meansmc do not overlap with each other. Specifically,
we constrain these means to be vectors consisting of 1s and 0s, with the equal number of neurons
activating for each class. From the number of classes C and size of the embedding space K, the class
meanmc with class label c is then:
mc =
[{
1
}p
i=p∗(c...(c+1)),
{
0
}p∗(C−1)
i 6=p∗(c...(c+1))
]K
, (2)
where p is number of activated neurons per class and is given by p = KC , with i denoting the index
location and c the class label.
3.2 Learning Class Distributions
Using an embedding function θ with learnable parameters, we first project the data points from the
D-dimensional input space (x) to a smaller K-dimensional embedding (z) space. Every data point
xi is modeled as a distribution q(zi|xi) ∼ N (zi;µi,Σi) in this embedding space. To model each
class as a single distribution component, we map all data point distributions q(zi|xi) belonging to a
particular class c with a fixed component c of the prototype multi-modal distribution ε described
above, given by Equation 1. For our binary classification case, this model learns to project each
data point to a latent space z, where each data point is mapped to only one component of a bimodal
distribution ( N (m0, I) for Real and N (m1, I) for Fake); each component will then represent one
of the classes.
(1) Pre-training: Every sample xi in the source domain S is encoded into a latent distribution
q(zi|xi), where we minimize the distribution divergence metric d between this encoded latent distri-
bution q(zi|xi) with the corresponding component of our fixed prototype multi-modal distribution c
(based on its class label c):
Lpretrain = 1
N
[
N∑
i=1
d
(
q(zi|xi, yi), c
)]
(3)
such that yi = c, where c is the ground truth label for sample xi and c is the corresponding
prototype distribution component. This minimization learns an embedding subspace such that all
samples belonging to a class c are aligned close to each other with the component c of the prototype
distribution; samples belonging to different classes are mapped with the separate components (see
Fig. 1(a)).
(2) Fine-tuning (few-shot only): For the target domain T , we associate the few available training
samples with the same prototype distribution ε used before for learning the source domain S,
according to its class label. We then fine-tune the above pre-trained model θ with the target dataset.
In order to further mitigate overfitting during fine-tuning, we propose a spatial mixup augmentation
strategy. Specifically, we spatially mix two images in a vertical fashion, forming a new image by
taking half of the face from one image and another half from the other images.
(3) Testing: We encode each test sample xtest into the latent distribution q(ztest|xtest) by using the
trained encoder θ. We then compute the distance of this encoded latent distribution with respect to
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all the components of the prototype multi-modal distribution, and assign the label to the component it
is closest to:
yˆtest = argmin
{
d0, d1, ....dC−1
}
(4)
where dc is the distribution divergence distance between q(ztest|xtest) and c.
Distribution Alignment Distance: Every sample xi that is fed to encoder model θ outputs a
distribution q(zi|xi) ∼ N (zi;µi,Si). To align this distribution with the class component c of the
prototype distribution, we minimize the Wasserstein distance between them.
In case of multivariate Gaussians, a closed-form solution of the 2-Wasserstein distance [16] between
two distributions P and Q is given by:
WPQ =
[
‖µP − µQ‖22 + Tr
[
ΣP + ΣQ − 2
(
Σ
1
2
PΣQΣ
1
2
P
) 1
2
]] 12
(5)
In our case, we assume that encoder θ predicts diagonal covariance matrix, which allows us to
simplify the distance:
d(qi, c) = Wqic =
[
‖µi −mc‖22 + ‖S
1
2
i − I
1
2 ‖2Frob
] 1
2
(6)
4 Datasets
With the rapid progress in synthetic media generation, a number of datasets focusing on facial forgery
detection have been developed recently [40; 18; 54; 11; 24; 10]. Since our goal is to generalize across
datasets as well as methods, we focus on those with sufficient diversity; see Fig. 2.
(a) FF++ [40] (b) Google DFD [11] (c) Dessa [31] (d) Celeb DF [54] (e) AIF [4]
Figure 2: Sample frames from the datasets used for evaluation of our experiments. The top row
shows the frames from the real videos and bottom row shows the frames from the corresponding
fake videos for paired datasets (FF++ and Google DFD) and randomly selected videos for unpaired
datasets (Dessa, AIF, and Celeb DF). For FF++, the frames from DF manipulation method are shown.
FaceForensics++ (FF++) [40]: This is the one of the largest datasets in terms of variety and
manipulations. The dataset contains over 1000 different videos (different identities), with each
video manipulated by four different forgery methods, including DeepFakes (DF) [9], FaceSwap
(FS) [25], Face2Face (F2F) [46], NeuralTextures (NT) [47]. DF are the most circulated videos on the
internet while NT produce high-quality re-enactment videos; hence, we decided to focus on these
two manipulation methods.
Google DeepFake Detection (Google DFD) [11]: This dataset consists of 3000 deepfake videos
with 28 unique actors in different locations. To avoid data redundancy, we select all videos from a
particular location (i.e., 228 fake and 28 real videos). In order to obtain an equal number of videos
per class, we randomly pick one deepfake video per identity.
Celeb DF (v2) [54]: Celeb-DF (v2) is a very challenging dataset of real and synthesized deepfake
videos of celebrities with similar visual quality with the online circulated deepfakes. It includes 590
original videos and 5639 corresponding DeepFake videos. Similar to Google DFD, we randomly
pick 590 deepfake videos and use all 590 real videos for a fair comparison.
Dessa In-the-Wild [31]: The dataset consists of real and fake videos (84 each) of celebrities and
politicians created with very high-quality deepfake generation methods.
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AIF In-the-Wild [4]: The AI Foundation (AIF) dataset is a new video dataset which we introduce1.
It consists of ∼110 unpaired real and deepfake videos. This is a relatively difficult dataset, with
videos captured in low-quality lighting conditions and extreme blurring in some cases; however, this
makes it particular interesting as a real-world test case.
5 Results
5.1 Experimental Settings
All of our experiments are run on an Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 TI and all models use an ILSVRC
2012-pretrained ResNet-18 [17] backbone. Our models are implemented in Pytorch trained with
an Adam optimizer (default parameters) using a batch-size of 128. Given that we want to study the
transfer results of different loss formulations, we did not focus on hyper-parameter optimization of
individual models.
All videos are converted to individual frames as described in Figure 3, and we report accuracies
on a per frame basis. Unless otherwise stated, we apply our proposed spatial mixup augmentation
followed by standard flipping to all baselines as well as our method; for fine-tuning it is applied with
source images corresponding to the same class.
Figure 3: Video pre-processing: We extract 30 frames from every video spaced at equal intervals and
automatically crop each frame (256× 256 pixels). We ensure that at least 90% of the crop is covered
by a face region. FF++ and Google DFD, already provide face masks; for the others, we use OpenCV
DLib.
5.2 Transfer between Manipulation Methods
We investigate how well our method transfers between different manipulation methods, and compare
against seven state-of-the-art domain-adaption/few-shot learning methods on the FF++ dataset [40]:
Deep Domain Confusion (DDC) [48], Deep Correlation Alignment (CORAL) [44], Classification and
Contrastive Semantic Alignment (CCSA) [32], d-SNE [52], ForensicTransfer (FT) [8], ProtoNets [43],
and RelationNets [45]. The domain adaptation methods [48; 44; 32; 52] learn a common latent space
for source and target domain and train a classifier over this joint embedding. Thus, the zero-shot
scenario for these methods boils down to training a classifier on the source domain. Results are shown
in Tab. 1 and Fig. 4.
Table 1: Classification accuracy for zero-shot transfer: the models are trained on one forgery method
and then tested on data from a another (unseen) manipulation technique. We achieve comparable
results within the same domain; however, our method generalizes significantly better.
Trained with DF Trained with NT
Model DF NT DF NT Mean
Classifier 95.92 57.80 68.75 91.30 78.44
Prototypical Nets [43] 98.15 60.58 69.57 95.27 80.89
Relation Nets [45] 98.11 57.15 68.70 91.13 78.77
FT [8] 91.29 62.86 75.50 83.50 78.28
DDT (ours) 98.01 64.10 78.82 92.05 83.25
1The AIF dataset is donated by the AI Foundation to the authors
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Figure 4: Few-shot manipulation transfer2: we pre-train a model with one manipulation method and
fine-tune with a varying number of images of another manipulation approach. We outperform all
the other methods, and achieve 90.01% accuracy for DF and 80.61% for NT when only using 100
images.
5.3 Transfer between Forgery Datasets
Following the previous section, we observe that NT and DF manipulations exhibit transfer. We further
validate the claim by exploring the transfer on different datasets. Since there are no benchmark
datasets to evaluate NT manipulation, we evaluate on a variety of DF manipulation datasets: Google
DFD [11], Celeb DF [54], Dessa [31], and AIF [4]. Results for zero-shot transfer from FF++ to other
datasets are shown in Tab. 2; few-shot results are visualized in Fig. 5.
Table 2: Zero-shot classification accuracy from FF++ to four other datasets: although there is a
significant shift in domains (e.g., Google DFDC and Dessa contain mostly frontal faces in contrast
to AIF which varies much more in pose and lightning), our method achieves transfer performance
significantly higher than all baselines (last column).
Method FF++ Google DFD AIF Dessa Celeb DF Mean
Classifier 91.02 79.87 54.26 63.45 65.32 70.78
Prototypical Nets [43] 97.16 71.34 61.73 63.57 58.03 70.36
Relation Nets [45] 96.46 72.75 58.08 56.19 63.19 69.84
FT [8] 84.71 67.82 62.94 69.40 47.83 66.54
DDT (ours) 92.23 81.21 60.79 74.28 68.83 75.47
Figure 5: Few-shot transfer from FF++ [40] to three other dataset. Our method outperforms all the
other approaches giving 84.80%, 77.07%, 70.32% accuracy for Dessa, Celeb DF, and AIF dataset,
respectively after fine-tuning with 100 images.
2All the few-shot experiments are averaged over 10 runs.
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5.4 Effect of Spatial Augmentation
All previous results, including baselines, use our proposed spatial augmentation. We now evaluate
the effectiveness of the data augmentation strategy itself for the binary classifier and our method.
Fig. 6 shows that our augmentation yields similar performance when tested on the same manipulation
method; however, it shows significantly better generalization results on unseen forgery methods.
Similar to zero-shot experiments, we evaluate the effect of spatial augmentation for few-shot learning;
see Fig. 7. To this end, we mix images from the target domain with the images from the source
domain. Every time we randomly pick a different image of the same class from the source domain
to mix with the images of the target domain. In contrast to zero-shot self-manipulation results,
where we did not see a significant effect on the same manipulation method, we now notice a small
improvement using spatial augmentation. For instance, for the NT to DF manipulation transfer task,
after fine-tuning with 100 images accuracy improves by 3.81% (76.33% to 80.14%) for the binary
classifier and 2.3% (87.71% to 90.01%) for our approach.
Figure 6: Effect of our proposed spatial augmentation for manipulation transfer: applying augmenta-
tion during training increases the zero-shot accuracy for both the methods and both experiments: (1)
NT to DF (75.94% to 78.82% for DDT) (2) DF to NT (57.25% to 64.10% for DDT)).
Figure 7: Effect of applying spatial augmentation during few-shot manipulation transfer with a binary
classifier and our method. Blue and orange colors indicate fine-tuning w/o and w/ spatial augmenta-
tion, respectively. We observe a small improvement during fine-tuning across all experiments.
6 Conclusion
We have presented Deep Distribution Transfer, a new method for generalized zero and few-shot
transfer learning for facial forgery detection. The core idea of our method is a new distribution-based
loss formulation that can be efficiently trained to bridge the gap between domains of different facial
forgery methods or unseen datasets. In a series of experiments, we show that the proposed method
transfers well between widely-used face forgery data datasets while outperforming state-of-the-art
baselines by a significant margin in both zero-shot and few-shot settings. For instance, we achieve a
4.88% higher detection accuracy for zero-shot and 8.38% for the few-shot case transferred from the
FaceForensics++ to Dessa dataset. Overall, we believe that our generalized forensics transfer method
is an important stepping stone towards making automated media forensics viable in practical settings,
given that we ultimately need to have a reliable detector which is capable of handling previously
unseen fakes and new data sources.
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Broader Impact
The rapid development of facial manipulation methods such as deepfakes has become a severe issue in
the context of social media and online video platforms, hence making the research on media forensics
a critical research area within the machine learning community. Although there have been works
focusing on automated detection methods with neural networks, such methods train and test within
the same domain of data and methods. In this work, we directly address this limitation, and aim to
generalize across forgery techniques and datasets with a new zero-shot and few-shot formulation. We
believe that this transfer is critical towards making learned forgery detection methods practical, given
that new fake methods appear at a rapid rate and it is unrealistic to expect to have access to a large
training corpus for each new method. Ultimately, we hope that our method is a first stepping stone
towards automated forgery detection on in-the-wild videos, for instance on Youtube, Facebook, or
Twitter, rather than focusing on individual (potentially biased) academic datasets. In addition, we
hope that the release of our code and trained models can be already of practical use to fact checkers
as well as other researchers building upon on our work.
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A Datasets
A.1 Dataset Statistics
We evaluate our zero/few-shot transfer approach on five different forgery detection benchmark and
in-the-wild video datasets: FaceForensics++ [40], Google DFD [11], Celeb DF [54], Dessa [31], and
AIF [4] dataset. The exact details of train-test split used for our experiments are listed in Tab. 3.
Table 3: Dataset statistics showing videos per class. For FF++ and Dessa, we use the already provided
split; for the other datasets, we provide our own train-test split. Note that for Google DFD, we have
very few real videos; hence, we only evaluate zero-shot performance for this dataset. For all other
datasets, we explore both zero-shot and few-shot transfer. All results in the main paper are reported
on these train-test splits.
Mode FF++ [40] Google DFD [11] Celeb DF [54] Dessa [31] AIF [4]
Train 720 - 500 70 12
Val 140 - - - -
Test 140 28 90 14 99
A.2 Detailed of Google DFD Selection Strategy
In order to avoid redundant videos in Google DFD, we select 228 fake and 28 real videos following
the strategy described in Fig. 8.
(a) Same actor but different location (b) Different actors but same location.
Figure 8: Google DFD dataset selection strategy: (a) we have multiple videos of the same actor
(recorded in different locations) with deepfakes are created for all the real videos; i.e., we have
multiple videos with the same facial identity in different locations. (b) We pick one location (podium
in our case) and use the videos (real and fake) for this particular location.
B Details on Hyperparameters
We use the ILSVRC 2012-pretrained ResNet-18 [17] network as a backbone for our experiments
to obtain a 256-dimensional embedding vector. We then apply one or more dense layers on top of
this embedding based on what transfer learning approach we are training with. For ForensicTransfer
(FT) [8], we used the original architecture and setup as proposed in the original paper.
For pre-training (zero-shot) experiments, we use a learning rate of 1e-3 with a decay when validation
loss plateaus for five consecutive epochs, early stopping with the patience of 10 successive epochs on
the validation loss. For fine-tuning (few-shot) and domain transfer experiments, we use a learning
rate of 1e-5 without any decay, early stopping with the patience of 30 consecutive epochs on the
training loss since no validation set is available. During fine-tuning, we use the same seed across runs
and for each method to ensure consistency.
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C Additional Experiments
C.1 Effect of Adding More Manipulation Methods
In this section, we evaluate how well a model trained with DF or NT or both manipulations from
FF++ dataset [40] is able to detect fake videos from a different and unseen dataset.
Table 4: Zero-shot transfer comparison from different manipulation methods. A model pre-trained
with different manipulation methods from FF++ [40] dataset is evaluated on four different datasets:
Google DFD, AIF, Dessa, and Celeb DF. We experiment with three combination of manipulations,
models trained with DF only, NT only and both manipulations.
Method Manipulation Google DFD AIF Dessa Celeb DF Mean
DF 79.10 53.78 55.35 63.37 62.90
Classifier NT 68.01 53.01 58.80 52.90 58.18
DF+NT 79.87 54.26 63.45 65.32 65.72
DF 81.94 53.06 59.28 67.98 65.56
DDT (ours) NT 75.38 55.47 59.52 66.99 64.34
DF+NT 81.22 60.79 74.28 68.83 71.28
Tab. 4 shows that a model pre-trained with both DF and NT manipulations boosts accuracy by
0.85%(from 67.98% to 68.83%) for Celeb DF, 5.32% (from 55.47% to 60.79%) for AIF and a large
14.76% (from 59.52% to 74.28%) for Dessa dataset, for our proposed method. Similarly, for the naive
classifier, the accuracy is boosted by 1.95%(from 63.37% to 65.32%) for Celeb DF, 0.48% (from
53.78% to 54.26%) for AIF and 4.65% (from 58.80% to 63.45%) for Dessa dataset. An important
observation is that adding more variety in manipulations methods for pre-training yields to better
generalizability; i.e., we obtain better detection results on different, previously unseen, datasets. This
is very promising and shows a path forward to the future of forgerey detection when more datasets
will become publicily available, which would allow us to obtain even stronger models with our
method. At the same time, there is no performance degradation on the Google DFD dataset when we
move from DF pre-trained model to DF+NT pretrained model. Hence, adding more variety in terms
of manipulation methods for pre-training does not come at the cost of already included target forgery
techniques.
C.2 Effect of Applying Spatial Augmentation on Other Datasets
In this section, we study the effect of applying our proposed augmentation on other datasets. We
evaluate the genralization results on two challenging AIF and Dessa datasets.
Figure 9: Zero-shot transfer comparison from FF++ to other datasets for a naive classifier and our
method. All the models are pre-trained on (NT + DF) manipulation both, with and without spatial
mixup augmentation.
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Fig. 9 shows that applying spatial mixup augmentation during pre-training generalizes better to other
datasets as well. For the Dessa dataset, we observe 4.29% (from 60.59% to 64.88%) improvement
for Classifier and a massive 10.31% improvement (from 63.97% to 74.28%) for DDT.
Figure 10: Effect of applying our spatial augmentation during few-shot transfer to other datasets for
a binary classifier and our method. During fine-tuning, we again observe consistent improvements
across all experiments.
D Result Tables
In this section, we document the line graphs of all the few shot experiments.
Table 5: Few-shot manipulation transfer from NT to DF.
Few-Shot Deep Prototypical Relation Forensic DDT
Images Classifier DDC CORAL CCSA d-SNE Nets Nets Transfer (Ours)
0 image 68.46 68.46 68.46 68.46 68.46 69.67 68.70 75.80 78.82
5 images 74.13 74.69 74.40 72.47 73.0 73.84 76.02 81.85 83.56
10 images 74.37 74.62 74.44 72.55 73.05 74.75 77.60 82.23 83.99
25 images 75.85 76.37 76.15 72.58 73.23 75.83 77.78 83.77 85.60
50 images 77.64 78.92 78.97 72.57 73.39 78.92 78.60 85.25 86.69
100 images 80.14 79.13 79.98 72.71 73.67 83.52 80.31 87.26 90.01
Table 6: Few-shot manipulation transfer from DF to NT.
Few-Shot Deep Prototypical Relation Forensic DDT
Images Classifier DDC CORAL CCSA d-SNE Nets Nets Transfer (Ours)
0 image 57.80 57.80 57.80 57.80 57.80 60.58 57.15 62.86 64.10
5 images 65.70 65.28 66.18 64.60 62.02 69.61 68.49 69.61 74.59
10 images 65.97 65.89 66.66 65.34 63.60 71.19 71.12 70.10 75.48
25 images 67.48 66.17 66.71 65.74 64.28 71.23 71.76 72.75 76.73
50 images 68.37 66.40 66.57 65.90 64.50 71.57 74.89 74.83 78.62
100 images 69.33 66.68 67.04 66.13 65.32 71.74 77.81 76.23 80.61
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Table 7: Few-shot transfer from FF++ to Dessa
Few-Shot Deep Prototypical Relation Forensic DDT
Images Classifier DDC CORAL CCSA d-SNE Nets Nets Transfer (Ours)
0 image 64.88 64.88 64.88 64.88 64.88 63.57 56.19 69.40 74.28
5 images 73.67 71.04 70.85 69.57 70.27 69.25 63.52 72.20 79.60
10 images 74.20 71.15 70.91 69.60 70.48 70.16 66.19 72.86 81.18
25 images 75.04 71.08 71.08 70.43 70.92 71.21 66.82 74.83 81.27
50 images 77.05 71.24 71.28 70.88 71.09 73.09 69.76 75.94 82.91
100 images 78.03 72.54 72.65 71.08 71.37 74.07 70.78 76.42 84.80
Table 8: Few-shot transfer from FF++ to Celeb DF
Few-Shot Deep Prototypical Relation Forensic DDT
Images Classifier DDC CORAL CCSA d-SNE Nets Nets Transfer (Ours)
0 image 63.32 63.32 63.32 63.32 63.32 58.03 65.75 47.83 68.83
5 images 63.89 63.82 63.70 63.20 63.38 59.61 66.47 62.39 69.14
10 images 64.88 64.49 64.23 63.92 63.40 62.07 66.90 62.98 71.68
25 images 67.10 65.30 65.43 64.12 64.47 63.37 68.20 66.09 72.59
50 images 68.21 68.64 68.01 65.45 65.66 65.03 68.72 69.07 73.94
100 images 70.60 70.54 70.25 66.47 66.09 67.77 69.51 70.78 77.07
Table 9: Few-shot transfer from FF++ to AIF
Few-Shot Deep Prototypical Relation Forensic DDT
Images Classifier DDC CORAL CCSA d-SNE Nets Nets Transfer (Ours)
0 image 54.26 54.26 54.26 54.26 54.26 61.73 58.08 62.94 60.79
5 images 56.75 59.02 58.70 55.92 55.24 62.67 63.54 61.52 67.82
10 images 58.02 59.85 59.82 56.48 55.25 63.53 63.92 62.43 69.61
25 images 60.65 61.26 61.12 57.12 56.04 64.65 65.40 63.40 70.11
50 images 62.37 61.33 62.56 57.21 56.70 66.64 66.51 65.66 69.56
100 images 65.14 63.011 62.84 57.26 57.23 68.08 68.35 67.68 70.32
Table 10: Few Shot Transfer with and without spatial augmentation for DF to NT within the FF++
dataset.
Few-Shot Classifier DDT (Ours)
Images Without Aug With Aug Without Aug With Aug
0 image 57.80 57.80 64.10 64.10
5 images 63.07 65.70 73.60 74.59
10 images 64.96 65.97 74.14 75.48
25 image 66.98 67.48 75.94 76.73
50 image 67.59 68.37 77.17 78.62
100 image 68.46 69.33 78.27 80.61
Table 11: Few-shot transfer with and without spatial augmentation for NT to DF within the FF++
dataset.
Few-Shot Classifier DDT (Ours)
Images Without Aug With Aug Without Aug With Aug
0 image 68.46 68.46 78.82 78.82
5 images 73.32 74.13 82.24 83.56
10 images 73.67 74.37 82.95 83.99
25 image 74.68 75.85 84.33 85.60
50 image 75.15 77.64 86.14 86.69
100 image 76.33 80.14 87.71 90.01
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Table 12: Few-shot transfer with and without spatial augmentation for FF++ to AIF.
Few-Shot Classifier DDT (Ours)
Images Without Aug With Aug Without Aug With Aug
0 image 54.26 54.26 60.79 60.79
5 images 55.31 56.75 64.21 67.82
10 images 55.60 58.02 64.56 69.61
25 image 56.79 60.65 66.76 70.11
50 image 58.69 62.37 67.15 69.56
100 image 63.26 65.14 68.35 70.32
Table 13: Few-shot transfer with and without spatial augmentation for FF++ to Dessa.
Few-Shot Classifier DDT (Ours)
Images Without Aug With Aug Without Aug With Aug
0 image 64.88 64.88 74.28 74.28
5 images 72.80 73.67 77.78 79.60
10 images 73.35 74.20 78.94 81.18
25 image 74.25 75.04 79.55 81.27
50 image 76.00 77.05 79.54 82.91
100 image 76.55 78.03 80.81 84.80
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